Introduction
There can hardly be a prison in the country that could continue to work as it does if there was a large scale collapse of voluntary, community and social enterprise services for people in custody Martin 2013: no pagination; see also Neuberger, 2009; Armstrong, 2002 Although the value and contribution of voluntary organisations has been widely acknowledged (e.g. Corcoran and Hucklesby, 2013; Maguire, 2012; Mills et al., 2012; Benson and Hedge, 2009) , the effects of their work are not clear. Existing literature presents a tension. For some, voluntary organisations empower prisoners and probationers, enabling them to build social capital (e.g. Bilby et al., 2013; Cohen, 2009; Lewis et al., 2007; Lippke, 2003) . For others, the 'benevolent' work of voluntary organisations extends control, increases the scale of penality, and shores up coercive carceral regimes (e.g. Cox, 2013; Armstrong, 2002; Cohen, 1985; McWilliams, 1983; Ignatieff, 1978; Foucault, 1977) .
I address this tension and contribute towards better understanding how the work of voluntary organisations affects prisoners and probationers, by analysing voluntary sector involvement in a translation 3 of ideas from policy rhetoric into national practice.
Translation illustrates how the process of relationship building succeeds or fails and how actors impose their definitions of a situation upon other actors (Gray et al., 2009; Callon, 1986) . This translation began with the Breaking the Cycle Green Paper (MoJ, 2010) , and culminated in the enactment of the 12 month mandatory statutory supervision requirement (hereafter 'supervision requirement') through the Offender Rehabilitation Act
This translation encompassed the prison-based PbR pilot schemes at HMPs
Peterborough and Doncaster and the publication of Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform (MoJ, 2013c) . Although the PbR pilots initially emphasised voluntary participation, rehabilitation and resettlement, I argue that they directly enabled the supervision requirement for all prisoners sentenced to less than 12 months in custody 4 .
Extending post-release supervision to these prisoners for the first time in recent history (MoJ, 2013c: 6 ) is predicted to result in 13,000 additional offenders being recalled to custody annually and cost £16 million (Prison Reform Trust, 2013: 1) . This analysis demonstrates how the involvement of certain voluntary organisations and a discursive voluntary sector in this translation enabled and justified the supervision requirement, and associated extensions in the spatial and temporal reach of carceral power.
I draw on data collected through document analysis of policy and voluntary organisation publications, which formed part of a larger research project conceptualising the penal voluntary sector in England and Wales. To map the translation, policy publications that followed Breaking the Cycle were analysed (MoJ, 2011a; MoJ, 2011b; MoJ, 2012a; MoJ, 2013a; MoJ, 2013b; MoJ, 2013c; MoJ, 2015a; MoJ, 2015b) , along with the voluntary organisation responses to crucial stages of the translation (Howard League, 2013; Prison Reform Trust, 2013; Howard League, 2011; Nacro, 2011; Social Finance, 2011; St Giles Trust, 2011) . First, the penal voluntary sector is defined. Policy reforms are then introduced and the four phases of their translation are examined. The effects of this translation are discussed and the theoretical implications of this analysis explored.
The penal voluntary sector
This analysis is situated in the penal and policy context of England and Wales. Although there are important differences between territories, the voluntary sector and the marketisation of penal services are issues of international import. This discussion is thus particularly relevant to Canada, the USA and Australia, which have similar penal policy developments involving the voluntary sector (Ilcan and Basok, 2004; Armstrong, 2002; Wallis, 2001 ). Diverse voluntary organisations play an important and increasing role in the operation of imprisonment and supervision (e.g. Martin, 2013; Neuberger, 2009; Armstrong, 2002) , but understandings of the penal voluntary sector are still lacking Mills et al due to the limited attention devoted to charitable organisations by scholars (Armstrong, 2002: 345) . There is a relative dearth of voluntary sector research in punishment, compared to housing and social care scholarship (Corcoran, 2011: 33 (Maguire, 2012; Kendall and Deakin, 2010) , although this distinction has been sullied by recent involvement of voluntary organisations in penal service delivery contracts and partnerships with private companies (Neilson, 2009; Alcock and Scott, 2007) .
Voluntary organisations are assumed to have a distinctive ethics of compassion, rehabilitative approach, ability to engage (ex-)offenders, and focus on the needs and socioeconomic integration of individuals (Goddard, 2012; Maguire, 2012; Mills et al., 2012; Corcoran, 2011; Meek et al, 2010; Brookman and Holloway, 2008; Lewis et al., 2007; Light, 1993) . Although the idea of voluntary action exerts a powerful hold over penal policy reform movements and evokes a richly positive imagery of inclusion "rmstrong 351; see also Crawford, 1999) , there remains surprisingly little evidence demonstrating exactly how or if a penal voluntary organisation is different than a for-profit business or a state agency when dealing with prisoners and probationers (Armstrong, 2002: 346, emphasis in original).
Policy reforms
The policy translation analysed here, which ran from Breaking the Cycle to the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014, is not entirely discrete. The Conservative Thatcher government introduced neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 90s, which privatised public services by creating competitive service delivery markets (Maguire, 2012; Corcoran, 2011; Ryan, 2011 (Carrabine, 2000) . This paper considers how voluntary organisations affected and opposed certain developments and resisted the expansion of carceral control.
However, it illustrates the critical role of voluntary organisations in extending the regulatory power of the penal apparatus by translating policies suggesting a significant expansion of carceral power into practice (cf. Carrabine, 2000) . The next section details the first phase of this translation, in which the MoJ published Breaking the Cycle, identified a penal problem and specified how and with whom it was to be addressed.
Four Phases of Translation Identifying a problem, a solution and the actors involved
In Breaking the Cycle (published 7 th December 2010), the MoJ defined and identified a problem (high rates of recidivism following release from prison) and a particular solution (using the PbR mechanism to pay penal service contractors). They also identified the actors involved (discursively and practically) in the resolution. The MoJ defined punishment's failings as shared problems, concerning everyone interested in creating a safe society Within the context of drawing on the expertise of everyone who can make a contribution to the rehabilitation revolution MoJ there were numerous specific references to the voluntary sector's role (e.g. MoJ, 2010: 10, 14, 15, 25, 27, 31, 35, 38, 41) .
The key problem was high rates of recidivism meaning most criminals continue to commit more crimes against more victims once they are released back onto the streets notwithstanding high penal spending despite a increase in the budget for prisons and managing offenders in the last ten years almost half of all adult offenders released from custody reoffend within a year MoJ The MoJ characterised the penal system as an expensive way of giving the public a break from offenders before they return to commit more crimes
High recidivism was presented as a shared problem throughout society, threatening the safety and security of the law-abiding citizen who has a right to feel safe in their home and their community MoJ The apparent long-term threat caused by young offenders was also highlighted if we do not prevent and tackle offending by young people then the young offenders of today will become the prolific career criminals of tomorrow MoJ The MoJ connected these problems to the economic recession stating the imperative to reduce the costs of punishment and emphasising their organisational commitment to playing its part in reducing spending to return the country to economic growth "y stressing the immediate and long-term negative effects of recidivism, Breaking the Cycle explained the problem of the expensive and failing penal system evocatively, so interested groups could relate, and presented a normative solution.
Specific measures were proposed to resolve this shared problem and ostensibly benefit citizens throughout society, but the practices of imprisonment and probation were not critiqued. The predicament of high spending yet enduring recidivism was explained by one failing of penal policy and practice the lack of a firm focus on reform and rehabilitation MoJ "s such significant amounts of money have been spent without properly holding providers to account for results MoJ PbR was identified as the solution to recidivism, as its firm focus on outcomes apparently incentivises all service providers to innovate and improve effectiveness at reducing reoffending MoJ 10, see also 6, 12, 38). The principle of decentralisation was also emphasised moving away from centrally controlled services dominated by the public sector, towards a more competitive system that draws on the knowledge, expertise and innovation of a much broader set of organisations from all sectors MoJ These proposals were presented as a fundamental break with the failed and expensive policies of the past through the new focus on discovering what works the methods of punishment and rehabilitation which actually reduce crime by reducing the number of criminals MoJ "s such Breaking the Cycle provided a once in a generation opportunity for providers from all sectors to work together to make a real difference to punishment, safety and economic recovery (MoJ, 2010: 9) . This rehabilitation revolution promised to change those communities whose lives are made a misery by crime MoJ To achieve this improve safety and generate savings to the taxpayer MoJ 1) the MoJ called on the skills of the private sector and civil society to provide new rehabilitation programmes delivered on a payment by results basis MoJ
Breaking the Cycle described a new mechanism through which public sector organisations, the private sector and civil society should compete in new markets MoJ to improve public safety and reduce the economic burden of punishment. It defined the identities of interested stakeholders, i.e. penal service providers from all sectors with the skills to enhance prisoner and probationer rehabilitation, who share the concerns of improving public safety and stimulating economic recovery. Notably, the MoJ was constructed as a powerful macro-actor, indispensable to other interested actors.
Competitive commissioning of penal services through the PbR mechanism is essential to achieve the mutually desirable outcomes of improved public safety and economic growth.
Such commissioning must be routed through MoJ procurement processes. Breaking the Cycle defined a set of shared problems and solutions, and specified the roles of interested actors. But these solutions and roles were not yet accepted nor adopted by interested actors The MoJ invited feedback on its proposals we want to hear your views on the benefits and challenges posed by implementing them This consultation process constituted the second phase of the policy translation, which is now examined.
Submission and rejection
Seeking feedback should participate in competitive penal service markets. The Howard League rejected the proposals and defined its interests differently. Nacro stated that Breaking the Cycle offers a real opportunity for positive reform commending the victim focus and PbR's emphasis on outcomes (Nacro, 2011: 2) . Similarly, St Giles Trust recommended outsourcing prison and probation services to specialist voluntary and community sector agencies to deliver effective outcomes at less cost (St Giles Trust, 2011: no pagination) .
Conversely, the Howard League expressed dissidence and questioned multiple proposals,
arguing that criminal justice and imprisonment in particular is a blunt tool which cannot in itself provide lasting solutions to the problem of crime Howard League, 2011: 4) . They stressed that the underlying causes of local crime are best tackled through investment in public services beyond the criminal justice system be it health education or welfare Regarding PbR the MoJ response underscored that PbR will underpin all our work on reoffending stating we are clear that we want to rapidly build on these pilots b 7). There was neither acknowledgement of nor engagement with criticisms of this mechanism 6 . The impact of dissidence on MoJ consultations is further explored below. The next section considers the third phase of translation, during which the MoJ formally enrolled actors into its proposals and experimented with PbR through pilot schemes.
Experimentation and Enrollment
The first PbR pilot at Category B HMP Peterborough was significant in Breaking the Cycle. League, 2011: 8) and MoJ statements "we are not aiming to cut the prison population" (2011b: 2), "we will not push for community sentences to be used instead of prison" (2011b: 4); the Howard League's warning of "danger in making community sentences 'tougher'
[…] we must not shift community sentences too much towards punitive objectives for risk of repeating mistakes of the past" (2011: 10) and MoJ statement "non-custodial sentences need to be tough and demanding […] we will also consider further changes to the system, including ways in which we can use the market, and payment by results, to deliver more and tougher requirements" (2011b: 4). Serco's contract to operate HMP Doncaster expired in July 2011 (MoJ, 2012a: 3). Serco's successful bid proposed a PbR pilot scheme for prisoners approaching discharge, aiming to test the impact of replacing a multitude of process and output targets and performance monitoring with a single outcome-based target (to reduce the reconviction rate) with a strong financial incentive to achieve this MoJ a "lthough initially intended for all prisoners, the target group was reduced to short-sentence prisoners during the early stages of implementation MoJ a ii The rationale was explained only as providing intensive case management in custody for all offenders was not the most efficient or appropriate use of resources MoJ a ii
The Doncaster pilot demonstrates the MoJ's successful enrollment of the 'alliance' into Breaking the Cycle's proposals. The 'alliance' of private and voluntary sector service providers also subsequently targeted short-sentence prisoners, mirroring the Peterborough pilot and laying the foundations for enacting the supervision requirement.
The next section examines how the MoJ became the principal spokesperson for the heterogeneous actors involved in these pilots, ultimately mobilising their inputs to translate PbR and the supervision requirement from policy rhetoric into practice.
Results Spokesperson
The MoJ became the dominant spokesperson in this translation, reporting for all actors who responded to the consultation and participated in the PbR pilots. This group included some voluntary organisations in practice (as named above) and drew on a discursive 'voluntary sector' of service providers. The spokesperson is a powerful macro-actor that can mobilise the interests, roles and relations of entire networks (Callon and Latour, 1981) .
By defining a problem and solutions, deciding on outcome measures, signing contracts and generating results, the MoJ generated a series of intermediaries and equivalences (cf. Callon, 1986; Callon and Latour, 1981) However the MoJ merely emphasised the urgency for reform because the need to reduce reoffending is pressing c They ambiguously stated that they will take a measured approach to implementation MoJ, 2013c: 33) but reiterated that PbR contracts would commence from autumn 2014. This was presented as a necessary timescale because: to achieve the reductions in reoffending rates we need it is vital that we move ahead to put our new approach in place (MoJ, 2013c: 33) . Although concerns raised during consultation were at least acknowledged by the MoJ in this case, its position and implementation timescale remained unchanged.
Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform also proposed that statutory rehabilitation be extended to short-sentence prisoners (MoJ, 2013c: 6). These prisoners were the object of the PbR pilots at HMPs Peterborough and Doncaster, which ran with voluntary organisation involvement. Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform explained the need to support prisoners through the prison gate and deliver mentoring and rehabilitation support to get their lives back on track so they do not commit crime again MoJ c This was deemed particularly important for those released from short-sentences who currently do not get support they need to resettle in the community having the highest reoffending rates yet typically left to their own devices on release (MoJ, 2013c: 4). The document signalled a continuing role for the voluntary sector in this work noting that it has an important contribution to make in mentoring and turning
offenders lives around MoJ c
The PbR mechanism enabled the supervision requirement for short-sentence prisoners, funded by savings predicted from rolling out PbR for penal service providers (MoJ, 2013c: 4) . Notably, the need to reduce penal spending justified the introduction of PbR in Breaking the Cycle (MoJ, 2010: 8) . Through the process of translation following Breaking the Cycle, an apparently natural link (Foucault, 1977: 232) was created between short-sentence prisoners, the need to supervise them in the community and the necessity of 'rehabilitative' punishment delivered under PbR. The supervision requirement for shortsentence prisoners represents a significant extension of penal control over this group, for whom there was previously no mandatory supervision.
The supervision requirement was publicly welcomed by St Giles Trust (Owen, 2013) . 
Discussion
By mapping the translation that followed Breaking the Cycle, I demonstrate how voluntary organisations underpinned this translation, inventing the Social Impact Bond that stimulated the PbR pilots and facilitated the roll-out of PbR throughout penal service contracting, creating cost savings to finance the supervision requirement. The MoJ's discursive voluntary sector and the voluntary organisations practically involved in the translation facilitated the supervision requirement, which represents a significant expansion in community control (Cohen, 1985: 15) arguments about disciplining young offenders, the establishment of the penitentiary in the nineteenth century led to dramatic increases in the numbers imprisoned in England, through the apparent need to discipline petty offenders using the rules and regulations of the penitentiary to prevent them proceeding unimpeded to the commission of more dangerous offences Ignatieff The establishment of probation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century also increased the scale of punishment through the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 which enabled supervision for cases only where the offences were thought so trifling as to make punishment unnecessary Jarvis Second, recent reforms look set to expand punishment, by further fragmenting the legal power to punish and increasing the army of technicians involved in punishment (Foucault, 1977: 11) . The decentralising proposals in Breaking the Cycle draw on the expertise of everyone who can make a contribution to improving public safety MoJ 2010: 5). It is, however, questionable whether this represents progress towards more effective punishment and better public safety or rather, further fragmentation of the legal power to punish (away from the state) and increases in the scale of punishment (cf. Garland, 1990; Foucault, 1977) . That is, whether the effect of involving a broader set of providers from all sectors MoJ in competing for and delivering penal services is likely to be more effective punishment, or merely more punishment (cf. Cohen, 1985: 254) . Voluntary sector staff participation in PbR pilots and supervision for short-sentence prisoners can be equated to Foucault s subsidiary authorities of punishment and minor civil servants of moral orthopaedics whose presence means that the penal system is constantly growing Foucault
Third, these reforms insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body (Ignatieff, 1978: xiii; Foucault, 1977: 82) . The formerly automatic liberty afforded to shortsentence prisoners following release now has more restrictions and conditions attached.
The sentences of short-sentence prisoners therefore no longer end when they are released from prison and a further year has been added to the ambit of the criminal justice system Prison Reform Trust "ecause short-sentence prisoners currently do not get support they need to resettle in the community MoJ c a mandatory and coercive supervision requirement has been introduced. The continued liberty of shortsentence prisoners post-release is now conditional upon their willingness and capacity to comply with the requirements of their supervision orders (cf. Cohen, 1985: 286) .
This paper adds to the limited empirical knowledge about voluntary organisations (Corcoran, 2011; Mills et al., 2011; Armstrong, 2002) . It illustrates how voluntary sector involvement in penal policy can result in expanded penal control; and how apparently inclusionary 'support' policies may mean that penal institutions remain, their remit is widened, intervention is intensified, control is extended and the net of carceral power is widened (cf. Cohen, 1985: 15, 286 This analysis suggests that assuming beneficial outcomes such as empowerment and social capital (e.g. Bilby et al., 2013; Cohen, 2009; Lewis et al., 2007; Lippke, 2003 ) is problematic and demonstrates that the work of Cohen and Foucault inter alia remains highly relevant.
However, a unilateral control 'effect' of voluntary organisations' work is neither presented nor inferred here for two reasons. First, the diversity of organisations within the sector and their varied relationships with the statutory agencies of punishment (e.g. lobbying,
payment by results, contractual and informal relationships at different scales, such as with the MoJ and with individual prisons) means that one analysis certainly does not fit all.
Whilst the empirical evidence base surrounding the penal voluntary sector remains lacking, this analysis also demonstrates that both the control and emancipatory literatures appear to be inadequate, so suggests that more nuanced hybrid or integrated theorisation is required. The work of voluntary organisations can apparently result in both control and emancipation, or negative and positive effects. Without detracting from the utility and validity of control and netwidening theory, they tend to provide partial and limiting accounts which overlook variations in the substance and quality of the carceral net.
Although the work of voluntary organisations is neither an uncomplicated good nor a panacea, the potential for such work to have beneficial outcomes should not be discounted. The interim results from the pilots must be viewed with extreme caution for the reasons outlined above, but they do indicate a fall in reconviction events (MoJ, 2013a:
5-6) and there is some evidence that participants valued the opportunities provided (MoJ, 2015b: 30) . This reflects Lewis et al.'s study, which addressed British voluntary sector resettlement and mentoring Pathfinder projects with short-term prisoners transitioning into the community. It found offenders who had post-release contact with voluntary sector mentors did significantly better than any other group of prisoners analysed Lewis et al 2007: 47) . In follow-up interviews, over half of the participants indicated that the most beneficial aspect of the programme had been 'emotional support' or 'someone to talk to', which was cited almost four times as frequently as the next most common response: 'help with accommodation' (Lewis et al., 2007: 47) . Clearly, the potential for voluntary sector programmes to expand the scale of penality must not be overlooked, but it seems that voluntary sector staff can also have agentic effects and build positive relationships with prisoners and probationers (Maguire, 2012; Mills et al., 2012; Neuberger, 2009; Lewis et al., 2007) . These relationships appear to be unique and valuable, although this should not be assumed and further evidence is certainly required to substantiate this. It is however possible that voluntary sector staff should not solely be equated to Foucault's subsidiary authorities of punishment (1977: 10).
Desistance literature indicates that probation staff behaviours can confirm staff compassion and trustworthiness, and form the foundation upon which probationers will co-operate with services, commit to long-term compliance and take steps towards desistance from crime (Phoenix and Kelly, 2013; McNeill, 2006) . Whilst control and netwidening theories are valuable, they do not explain that a carceral net which enables and encourages those caught within will be experienced differently and lead to different outcomes from that which is, for example, disabling, violent and depressing. Although I would much prefer that short-sentence prisoners were offered resettlement support on a voluntary rather than mandatory basis, it is undeniable that short-sentence prisoners have high reoffending rates and are likely to experience difficulties (re-)integrating into the community post-release (MoJ, 2010).
The most pressing question is, then, whether voluntary organisations' work must always expand control, and whether it may also have beneficial effects. 
